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By David Hewitson and Guy Marot [ Fenix Insight Ltd. ]

Sea Lion Islands
52°30'

T

he Falkland Islands Mine Clearance Programme (FI MCP) ran from 2009 to 2020, through five
operational phases, some lasting only a few months, some extending across several years. A
core objective was to release land as efficiently as possible, only applying technical assets to
those specific areas of land that justified such attention. This article describes the approach that was
adopted to determine whether all reasonable effort (ARE) had been applied to each task in such a way
that current (and future) stakeholders would have confidence
Beauchene Island in that decision so as to manage the fear
61°
60°
59°
58°
of mines
being missed.
Two organizations were contracted by the UK government to

bombardment, and the abandonment of ammunition, a submuni-

deliver the FI MCP: the land release contractor (LRC), most recently

tion threat was also present. Some military clearance took place in

SafeLane Global; and the demining program office (DPO) provided

the immediate aftermath of the conf lict but was stopped following a

by Fenix Insight Ltd.1 Additionally, a strategic adviser (Alistair

number of accidents to clearance personnel. From 2009 to the dec-

Craib) provided advice, oversight, and contracting input. Around

laration of completion at the end of 2020, the FI MCP released over

20,000 anti-personnel (AP) and 5,000 anti-vehicle (AV) mines were

23 million m2 from 127 hazardous areas, clearing over 11,000 land-

declared as laid at the time of the 1982 conf lict. In addition to explo-

mines within 2.3 million m2 of cleared ground.

sive remnants of war (ERW) resulting from ground fighting, naval

Contractual and Stakeholder Expectations
When the program started in 2009, there was both a contractual

that the risk of missing mines will be addressed through the clearance of

requirement to exceed the International Mine Action Standards

areas that don’t need it just in case. Such an approach imposes avoidable

(IMAS) and a high level of uncertainty among local stakeholders who

costs (often at significant levels) as well as delays, combined with stake-

feared that mines would be missed, deminers would die, and the envi-

holder dissatisfaction, impatience, and implications for international

ronment would be unacceptably damaged by clearance operations.

treaty compliance. Professional, reputational, and contractual fears

All three fears expressed by locals were addressed during the first

about missing mines are further compounded when there is additional

phase of operations through a combination of thorough processes and

uncertainty about legal liability. The FI MCP was contracted under

procedures, a high level of transparency, engagement of local environ-

English Law in a context in which criminal and civil liability, includ-

mental stakeholders, and a program of public visits to working sites to

ing corporate manslaughter cases, are established and often publicized.

demonstrate the quality and reliability of the work.

16

The stated objective of the program was to release designated land

Every clearance program faces an identical fear: that mines might be

by “applying all reasonable effort to … remove all suspicion of mines/

missed. How this is addressed has huge implications for the cost, dura-

ERW … and to reduce the remaining risk from explosive hazards to as

tion, and efficiency of program operations. The project efficiency risk is

low as reasonably practicable (ALARP).”2
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The Falkland Islands were physically and
logistically challenging for clearance operations.
All graphics courtesy of the authors.

ALARP and ARE are distinct but closely-related terms. They sit

real-world cases there is at least some uncertainty. That means that

either side of the decision to release point in the land release process:

some overshoot will be unavoidable if all stakeholders are to agree with

the application of ARE to an area confirmed or suspected of contain-

the decision. There were some sites in the Falkland Islands where large

ing explosive ordnance (EO) hazards should result in a residual risk

numbers of mines were present, regularly laid out, undisturbed, and

that is ALARP. There are no recognized, defined criteria for what con-

fully recorded, taking the ARE decision as close to the theoretical ear-

stitutes either ARE or ALARP, although guidance exists in a number

liest point as is realistically possible (with fewer than 10 m2 cleared per

of areas, including in IMAS and in UK Health and Safety Executive

mine found). Alternatively, there were others sites where there was no

(HSE) publications.3

record, substantial changes had occurred since the conflict, and only

The approach adopted in the Falkland Islands was based on a number of basic principles:
•

assess ARE (resulting in over 15,000 m2 per mine).

The word reasonable in both ARE and ALARP indicates an
expectation of logical, transparent reasoning based upon reliable evidence to support decision-making.

•

one or two mines remained in large areas, making it much harder to

The effort encapsulated in ARE is not just the physical effort of

Figure 1. Conceptual illustration of the enabling and task level
approach to all reasonable effort (ARE).
Developed by David Hewitson for the GICHD.

clearing land but includes enabling effort in training people,
selecting and using appropriate equipment, establishing and implementing effective quality and information
management systems, and using evidence to support
decisions (Figure 1).
•

The decision to declare that ARE has been applied and
that no further activity is required before releasing the
site only has value if other stakeholders agree.

The challenge, implicit within the concept of ARE, is to recognize that ARE has been applied at the earliest point in a land
release task without undershooting the decision (i.e., releasing
land before it is completely clear of EO hazards). The inevitable natural inclination is to overshoot—processing more land
than is absolutely necessary, just to be on the safe side. In most
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General Approach and Background
A lack of stakeholder confidence in released land often arises from

•

as the original records (although with occasional transcription

umentation frequently consists of a disparate collection of paperwork

errors), including additional, limited details from 1982 at those

that can be hard for an individual reader, especially one not familiar

sites where UK military clearance took place, and informa-

with the task, to understand holistically. Even an expert will often have

tion about clearance (usually of individual visible mines) that

significant questions when reviewing such documents about what hap-

occurred over subsequent years

pened and why. While everything may have made complete sense to

•

information in published historical accounts

managers on the ground at the time of the work, if the task documen-

•

information from interviews with veterans

tation does not provide clear and accessible explanations, then later

•

interviews with local people who were present before, during,

readers are left feeling unsure about what went on and why, and IMAS
07.14 defines risk as “the effect of uncertainty on objectives.”4 A future
developer looking to use the land for a public project may determine
that further technical activity is necessary just in case. Any such action

and after the conflict
Further information became available as the clearance program
progressed:
•

comparison of what was actually found on the ground during

diminishes, and in some cases wholly destroys the worth of the origi-

previous clearance operations versus information in mine-

nal work, with all its costs, use of resources, and physical risk.

field records, allowing a general assessment of the reliability

In 2010, co-author David Hewitson worked with Bob Eaton of the

of records as well as results of detailed analysis (such as error

Survey Action Centre to develop a process-driven approach to land

brackets for distances and bearings recorded on maps)

release for the Tajikistan Mine Action Centre. The project included

•

other lessons learned during operations

development of a core document that would tell the story of the site.

•

real-world operational key performance indicators (KPIs)

The document aimed to explain:

Significant effort to identify and access potentially relevant infor-

•

what EO to expect at the site (and why);

mation was applied by the LRC throughout the program, recog-

•

how these expectations were reflected in the operational plan;

nizing the importance of doing so to drive confident and credible

•

what was actually found during operations; and

decision-making.

•

what decisions were taken during operations in light of what was
actually found.

Readers of the completed document should understand the task

Stage 3: Analysis and Planning
In addition to analysis of the expected threat type, detectability, and

process from start to finish as a connected narrative that makes sense

distribution, planning included geometric analysis of the expected

and leaves them confident in the decision to release the land as safe for

arrangement of mines: in rows and panels, orientation, and separa-

use. Other associated documents, such as daily narrative logs, detailed

tion. A key concept was that of the minimum survey target (MST):

mapping, quality management records, and certificates should also be

the smallest associated packet of mines defined in terms of numbers of

available for reference where necessary. However, the site implementa-

mines, numbers of rows, separation of rows, and separation of panels.

tion plan (SIP) would be the heart of the documented explanation of

In some cases, planners might have confidence that they were looking

what happened. The process (Figure 2) and associated documentation

for a combination of multiple rows of mines in several panels. In oth-

developed during that work was adopted in the FI MCP.

ers there might be no record but evidence that, if mines were present,

Stage 1: Tasking
In accordance with broader contractual requirements, a task order
specifies the hazardous area to be processed but does not specify land
release methods or any other technical details.

Stage 2: Information Collection
A fundamental part of the ARE process is identifying, accessing, and making use of all available information—not just information about the intended task site but also about the wider context of
operations and contamination, including evidence from previously
completed tasks. In the FI MCP, information was available from a
number of sources:
•

original Argentine records in Spanish created by the minelaying organizations and available for many (but not all) sites,
including sketch maps, number and types of mines, among
other details
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translated UK military records in English; essentially the same

uncertainty about why key land-release decisions were taken. Task doc-

THE JOURNAL OF CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS DESTRUCTION

they would be in at least a certain quantity and arrangement (based on
evidence that mines had never been laid in less than a given arrangement). On other occasions, particularly in areas that had been subject
to partial historical clearance, the MST might be a single mine.
The analysis of the MST drove decisions about the width and separation of targeted technical survey (TS) lanes as well as those cases
(where the MST was one or a very small number of mines) when targeted block clearance would be employed. Geometric analysis of the
MST was applied to ensure confidence that any targeted TS could not
go through a contaminated area without encountering at least one
piece of evidence of mines present, nor could adjacent lanes go either
side of a contaminated area (bracketing). In many areas the third
dimension of depth was also important, reflecting the effects of peat or
sand accumulation on top of the original mine contamination layer.5
Further analysis was conducted to identify the most appropriate
areas to target during TS. Where present, records often used paces or

Figure 2. The overall SIP process.

double paces as units of distance, bearings were taken using handheld
compasses, and reference points had often disappeared or were hard to
identify. Part of the ARE approach included analysis effort using reverse
engineering on completion of site operations to compare the locations
of actual finds, with distances and directions, against details in records.
This allowed pool of error assessments during planning for subsequent
tasks of where mines might be (if they were still in undisturbed rows)
or had originally been (if identifying areas requiring block clearance).
Moreover, the closing the loop effort was an important part of the overall
approach to demonstrating the reasoning aspect of ARE decisions.
The resulting plan provided program managers, as well as those who
would sign clearance certificates, with confidence that if no evidence of
mines was found in an area, then it could reasonably be concluded that
no mines were present. In doing so, the analysis laid the foundation
for the decision-making that would take place during the operational
phase to identify when ARE had been applied and when it was justified
to stop operations and declare the area safe for release.

Stage 4: Initial Review
The draft plan, prepared by the LRC, was reviewed by the DPO. Any
comments or questions were resolved before sign-off by both parties.
The process was both transparent and represented clear liability risk
sharing throughout.

Stage 5: Implementation
Implementation followed the agreed plan but with a constant
review process considering the implications of new information,
whether it was the discovery of mines where predicted or the absence
of mines where expected. New information could reinforce confidence

The deep peat of the Falkland
Islands made working conditions
difficult.
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Figure 3. Example of key decisions in the field review and change log (Site SA 077). Note inclusion of environmental remediation in
the effort applied at the task site.

in the planning assumptions or call them into question. Whenever

records, as well as evidence gained at previous sites, helped identify

the unfolding situation allowed refinement of the plan, or where it

areas where missing mine drills (MMDs) were required. The SIP pro-

demanded a rethink, such considerations were documented in the

vided a collaborative approach to looking at what had been found,

Field Review and Change Log section of the SIP (Figures 3 and 4).

where definite or potential gaps might be present, why those gaps exist,

In each case the LRC would discuss their thinking with the DPO,
and (once accepted) the decision log in the SIP would be signed by
both parties. The relationship was one of cooperative independence.
The DPO was prepared to ask for and review any evidence, and to
question the reasoning behind decisions to ensure that whatever was
captured in the record would make sense to future readers without
prior knowledge of the task.
Through the logs, key decisions were captured about when it was
appropriate to declare the site mine free, allowing a switch to battle
area clearance (BAC) methods, as well as the point at which ARE had
been applied in full. In every case, the countersignature by the DPO
helped both the general credibility of the decisions and ensured that
any perception of liability risk was shared between the DPO and the
LRC, reducing the risk of conducting extended clearance just in case,
while encouraging early and efficient completion of operations.
The LRC’s high-quality survey and mapping was a key component
of the decision-making process, allowing LRC managers and DPO
reviewers to see the evidence on site in a clear geographical context.
Review and comparison of what was found against information in

and what the extent of any additional clearance would be to show that
ARE had been applied.

Stage 6: Final Review
At the end of every task a post-completion analysis and management
review were carried out and captured in the SIP. Their purpose was to
close the loop between the experience gained on the specific task and
the wider body of accumulated evidence-based knowledge that would
feed into planning of future tasks.
The analysis and review addressed:
•

results of quality assurance and quality control inspections

•

results of any nonconformities, accidents, or complaints

•

how reliably planning information related to what was actually
found

•

efficiency of switching between TS, mine clearance, and BAC
activities

•

identification of any new information that might call into question wider planning assumptions

•

recommendations for improvement, including follow-up actions

•

KPI results

Figure 4. Logging of a technical response to newly discovered information (SA 059).
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Heavy machinery was required to work in extreme weather.

Conclusions
Some suggest that the FI MCP was easy because of the availability of

the umbrella of ARE. The performance indicators captured at the end

records for which many other programs don’t have comparable, avail-

of every task provided a solid basis for the planning of both individual

able information sources. Although certainly true that records are help-

sites and projections for overall program progress.

ful, for many sites in the Falkland Islands they were either unavailable

Most importantly, the completed SIP provides a transparent, com-

or of limited use. Additionally, partial clearance immediately after the

prehensive record of the decisions taken and evidence associated,

conflict left a situation of utter uncertainty. Even where records are reli-

all the way through the task life cycle: from initial planning, to in-

able, there is still a responsibility on mine action operators to make best

progress operational decision-making, to the final decision to declare

use of those records to drive efficiency, achieve safe
release of land at the earliest possible opportunity,
reduce the demands on public money, and make
resources available for other work.
Throughout the FI MCP, both the LRC and DPO
placed constant, rigorous emphasis on the collection and use of information to drive decision-making about when ARE had been applied in such a
way that other stakeholders would understand and
accept those decisions. The SIP helped program
planners and monitors to focus on the task at hand.
It helped them to think about what they were doing
and why, and encouraged them to consider all relevant factors (enabling and on-site) that fell under

Observations, conclusions, actions required
• Results of quality-assurance and quality-control inspections.
There were no QA observations. Post clearance quality control sampling
revealed no non-conformities.
• Land release process performance (key performance indicators/rations).
• Average demining rate
11.12 m2/deminer/day (6hr)
• Average efficiency
9.492/mine
• Average deminer day/mine
0.85 deminer days/mine
• BAC rate
656.21 m2/deminer/day
• Quality non-conformances, complaints, accidents. Nil
• Recommendations for improvement. Nil
• Follow-up actions arising from the review. Nil
Figure 5. Extract from SIP for site SA 053, including standardized KPIs.
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Penguins are not heavy enough to detonate
landmines and roamed freely among the
minefields.

that ARE had been applied and the land was safe to release, to (equally

on original work carried out in Tajikistan and refined for the needs of

importantly) the feedback loop to support improved ARE decision-

the FI MCP, but are applicable to any mine action program.

making at later sites.

One experienced and knowledgeable mine action practitioner who

At every stage, and in every respect, the common thread in the way

visited the Falkland Islands’ program said that, before they arrived,

that FI MCP program managers approached their task was through

they thought that the FI MCP’s approach to documenting land release

relentless, comprehensive, and careful collection and use of opera-

planning and decision-making would prove excessive. By the time they

tional contextual and performance data, constantly reducing uncer-

left they were firmly of the opinion that the SIP approach should actu-

tainty, and by extension risk, in every aspect of the program—from

ally be the minimum applied in any mine action program.

technical procedures to prioritization and planning at both task and
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ENDNOTES
Applying “All Reasonable Effort” in the Falkland Islands Mine Clearance Programme: Encouraging Efficient, Confident, and
Timely Evidence-Based Land Release Decision Making
by David Hewitson and Guy Marot [ Fenix Insight Ltd. ]
1.
2.
3.

4.
5.
6.

Previous incarnations of the LRC, responsible for work in earlier phases of the programme included Bactec International Ltd and Dynasafe
Bactec Ltd.
From Phase 5 project contractual documentation, Section 4 – Statement of Service Requirement.
IMAS 07.11 Land Release, Edition 1, Amendment 5, February 2019, includes broad guidance on the process elements influencing ARE. The
recently released TNMA 07.11/03 All Reasonable Effort (ARE), Version 1.0, March 2021, provides more detailed advice on what constitutes ARE
and how to demonstrate its application. Sources such as https://www.hse.gov.uk/managing/theory/alarpglance.htm explain the concept and
practice of ALARP.
IMAS 07.14 Risk Management in Mine Action, First Edition, February 2019, section 3 Terms, definitions and abbreviations.
In some case over 40cm of peat had ‘grown’ over the 1982 mine layer surface level, and on beach areas 11m of sand had accumulated.
Suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) in the Falkland Islands were likely to contain other forms of ERW as well as mines. Mine clearance procedures were targeted only on those parts of the SHA where mines were expected until the LRC and DPO were confident that they had all been
found and dealt with. At that point the remaining area within the fenced boundary of the SHA could be searched for non-landmine UXO
(mortar rounds, grenades, etc.) using the much faster BAC techniques. At some SHAs less than 5 percent of the total SHA area was subject to
mine clearance procedures, but the entire area needed to be checked for other UXO hazards.
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